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Serious Tort Reform Isn't: A Critique of
Professor Sugarman's "Serious Tort Law
Reform"
HARRY M. SNYDER*
A reply to Professor Sugarman.
INTRODUCTION
Professor Stephen D. Sugarman's call for "serious tort reform" is
not serious. A serious proposal would be based on an objective analy-
sis of facts and policy. Professor Sugarman's article, however, relies
both on assertions of subjective bias and on premises that are contra-
dicted by current data. If implemented, Professor Sugarman's propo-
sal actually would lead to an increase in the number of persons in-
jured every year because there would be no adequate deterrence for
unsafe conditions or actions. Moreover, the plan threatens to leave
the unemployed and non-wage earners uncompensated for real losses
while it engenders no real dollar savings and deters whatever real
reform might otherwise be needed.
In his article Serious Tort Law Reform, Professor Sugarman pro-
poses transferring the responsibility to compensate small and moder-
ate accident injuries to an expanded employee benefit and social in-
surance system.' Cases involving long-term disabilities or serious
* Director, West Coast Regional Office Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
B.S. 1960, University of Southern California; J.D. 1963, University of California at Los
Angeles. The views expressed in this note do not necessarily represent those of Consum-
ers Union. The author thanks Lucinda Sikes of Harvard Law School, and Joy Robinson
of the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, for their thoughtful and diligent
assistance.
1. Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 795, 808-18
(1987).
disfigurements would continue to be resolved through the tort system
or through workers' compensation. Any other injury, however, would
fall into the provisions of Professor Sugarman's tort scheme. With
the aim of making tort law function more as a compensation plan,
Professor Sugarman proposes the following: (1) limit pain and suf-
fering damages to victims who have suffered a long term disability,
or serious disfigurement or impairment, and cap pain and suffering
awards at $150,000; (2) abolish the collateral source rule; (3) elimi-
nate the right of a jury to determine the amount of punitive dam-
ages; and (4) limit plaintiff attorneys' contingency fees. 2 These pro-
posed reforms are based on a series of faulty premises that
significantly weaken the credibility of Professor Sugarman's
argument.
Current Data Contradict Claims that Tort Reform Will Reduce
Insurance Costs
Professor Sugarman presumes that his tort reform measures will
reduce the cost of liability insurance. Under his plan, Professor
Sugarman claims that funding of a temporary disability insurance
program (TDI) and employee health benefits by employers will be
feasible due to the savings that would result from the reduction in
liability insurance premiums.3 Yet Professor Sugarman neglects to
show where these savings would come from, how much they would
be, or when they might begin. Furthermore, current data offer no
support for the proposition that such savings would result from im-
plementation of his proposal. Despite expectations that similar tort
law changes enacted in 1986 would lower insurance costs, the insur-
ance industry now asserts that the changes will not reduce rates.
4
For example, a recent study commissioned by the Insurance Ser-
vices Office (an industry trade organization) concluded that most of
the tort law changes enacted nationwide last year will have no effect
on insurance rates.5 After polling approximately 1200 insurance ad-
justers on the probable effect that recently enacted state tort changes
would have on insurance company payouts, the researchers found
that "the impact of the [tort] changes generally ranged from margi-
2. Id. at 819-38. Professor Sugarman also proposes eliminating any effect contrib-
utory or comparative negligence currently has on the amount a victim recovers. For a
summary of his plan, see id. at 838-40.
3. See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 843.
4. Experience from the 1986 Proposition 51 campaign in California is a perfect
example of this phenomenon. One year after the passage of Proposition 51, no apprecia-
ble improvement has resulted either in the availability or affordability of liability insur-
ance. See Wolinsky, Nader Assails Deep-Pockets Initiative as 'Hoax' on Public, L.A.
Times, June 5, 1987, at 3, col. 4.
5. See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, CLAIM EVALUATION PROJECT (1987).
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nal to imperceptible." 6 Specifically, the insurance adjusters esti-
mated that limitations on punitive damages and plaintiff attorneys'
contingency fees, two of the reforms recommended by Professor
Sugarman, would have no effect on insurance company payouts in
six hypothetical cases.7
Insurance companies in Florida conducted a study on the expected
impact of tort law changes on their cost of doing business. The study
reached similar conclusions: the reforms would have marginal im-
pact or none at all. As part of a 1986 tort reform package, the Flor-
ida Legislature passed an offset of collateral sources of compensation
and limitations on noneconomic damages8 - two measures that Pro-
fessor Sugarman advocates. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company -
one of the largest insurance companies in the country - reported
that the new tort law would have no effect on bodily injury claims
costs." In fact, instead of lowering premiums after the enactment of
the tort reform measures, Aetna raised premiums by 17.2%.10 Simi-
larly, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company reported that
the Florida tort changes would have only a "very small" impact on
medical professional liability: "[T]he noneconomic cap of $450,000,
joint and several liability on the noneconomic damages, and
mandatory structured settlements on losses above $250,000 will pro-
duce little or no savings to the tort system as it pertains to medical
malpractice.""'
The consequences of failing to achieve cost savings will be a repe-
tition of the current insurance crisis. That, in turn, will lead to cries
for very serious tort reform, and more studies.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id. The insurance adjusters estimated that insurance industry payouts would
be reduced if a cap on pain and suffering damages and a mandatory set-off in all cases of
collateral benefits were enacted nationwide. Because these reform measures would at the
same time substantially reduce any deterrent effect of tort, however, the potential savings
in liability insurance costs does not provide a strong argument for their adoption. More-
over, it is unclear why nationwide enactment of these measures would reduce insurance
costs when statewide enactment has not.
8. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, 1986 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 86-160
(West).
9. Rate Revision Request, Report on Bodily Injury Claim Cost Impact of Florida
Tort Law Change (Aug. 8, 1986) (filed with Florida Insurance Commissioner B.
Gunter). See also WEBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSE, THE CON-
FERENCE BOARD REPORT No. 893 18 (1987).
10. Aetna Casualty & Surety Ins. Co., Filing with the Florida Department of In-
surance (August 8, 1986).
!1. Filing with the Florida Department of Insurance, St. Paul Fire and Marine
Ins. Co., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., Medical Professional Liability, Addendum 1.
Studies Contradict Professor Sugarman's Claim that Victims
Receive Excessive Awards in a Tort System "Lottery"
Professor Sugarman characterizes the tort system as one in which
a few "lucky" victims "win the lottery" and go home with excessive
awards.1 2 However, evidence shows that judicial awards for damages
sustained under a tort theory are both consistent and reasonable. Ac-
cording to a 1987 report by the Rand Corporation, changes in the
size of personal injury awards are not due to lucky spins of the lot-
tery wheel; instead, they are a response to technological, social, and
economic changes in society, "to new legal rules and procedures, new
attorney and client strategies, evolving community standards, and
general social and economic change.""a The report also reveals that
the tort system provides consistent compensation for a victim
whether the case is heard in a rural or urban court, in California, or
anywhere in the nation. 4 Far from being the lottery system gone
wild that Professor Sugarman describes, tort is evolving to keep up
with a.rapidly changing society like a common law system should.
Professor Sugarman's characterization of tort as a lottery provid-
ing excessive awards is weakened further by his use of studies that
do not take into account post-trial adjustments of jury verdicts.15 A
1987 study reveals that the current tort system already has a mecha-
nism for reducing excessive awards and that the system is working.10
According to the Rand Study, about 20% of all verdicts are reduced,
and the average amount paid to victorious plaintiffs is only 71% of
the original jury award. Furthermore, the bigger the verdict, the
greater the chance it will be reduced as a result of post-trial motions,
appeals or negotiation. 17 The dynamics of these post-trial activities
and the resulting effect on jury awards seem to undermine Professor
Sugarman's argument that limitations on awards are urgently
needed. As the Rand researchers point out, "[i]n ignoring the effects
of post-trial processes already in place, critics are passing judgment
on the current system before fully evaluating it.""'
12. See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 796, 800.
13. M. PETERSON, CIVIL Juries in the 1980s: Trends in Jury Trials and Verdicts in
California and Cook County, Illinois (Rand Corp. Inst. for Civ. Just. 1987).
14. See id. at v-xii. The study reached similar findings in many jurisdictions. Me-
dian jury awards in urban centers were found to be similar to median awards in small
cities and rural counties. Business and contract cases were found to comprise a significant
proportion of all trials, even in rural areas.
15. See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 800 n.12.
16. M. SHANLEY AND M. PETERSON, POST-TRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AWARDS
(Rand Corp. Inst. for Civ. Just. 1987) [hereinafter JURY AWARDS].
17. Id. at 27. The study found that 33% of jury verdicts in excess of $1 million
were reduced, while 40% of verdicts in excess of $10 million were reduced. Only 10% of
awards less than $100,000 and 20% of awards between $100,000 and $1 million were
reduced.
18. Id. at vi.
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Professor Sugarman proposes that the judge, rather than the jury,
determine the size of any punitive damage award, because "the
awarding of punitive damages, at least by juries, is now out of con-
trol."' 9 In advocating this change, Professor Sugarman relies entirely
on subjective criteria and concludes that punitive damages are cur-
rently excessive, and that a judge is inherently a "better" decision-
maker than a panel of jurors. Objective data contradict both as-
sumptions. First, punitive damage awards do not occur frequently.
Only one to three percent of plaintiffs are awarded punitive dam-
ages.20 Second, a 1987 study on jury performance indicates that
"judges may not necessarily be better decision makers than individ-
ual jurors;"' 22 the study portrays jurors not as lottery spinners, but as
individuals who take seriously their responsibilities to award com-
pensation and to deter unsafe behavior.
Moreover, Professor Sugarman would have his readers believe that
juries act without supervision. This is not the case. Judges and the
appeals process presently act as final checks on allegedly excessive
punitive damage awards.22 The present system uses both jury and
judicial decision making to maximize the likelihood of a fair and just
result.
Professor Sugarman finds it "troublesome" that large corporations
run the highest risk of having large punitive damage awards assessed
against them.23 But punitive damages are particularly well suited for
large corporations which cannot be imprisoned and often canndt be
disciplined in any other way. The threat of punitive damages - a
large lump sum payment based on the company's particular financial
situation rather than the size or cost of the injury - acts to deter
gross misconduct of profit-seeking corporate managers and decision
makers. Professor Sugarman finds it "highly inappropriate" that "in-
nocent shareholders" bear the brunt of the punishment.24 However,
since it is in pursuit of profits for shareholders that excesses occur,
19. See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 830.
20. M. PETERSON, S. SARMZ & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS (Rand Corp. Inst. for Civ. Just. 1987).
21. M. SELVIN & L. PIcus, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE (1987). The
study reveals both the lack of consensus on a standard for evaluating jury performance
and the difficulty of applying any particular standard to measure the fairness of a civil
jury verdict.
22. See JURY AWARDS, supra note 16, at 36. When verdicts included punitive
damages, only 57% of the jury award was paid. In contrast, 82% of the amount was paid
in cases involving only compensatory damages.
23. See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 832.
24. id.
only the shareholders can hold management accountable for its ac-
tions and thereby minimize the likelihood of unsafe corporate activ-
ity. Therefore, the threat of a punitive damage award creates an in-
centive for management to act responsibly to protect its consumers
as well as its shareholders.
Evidence Contradicts Professor Sugarman's Claim that the Tort
System Does not Deter Unsafe Behavior
Professor Sugarman confines his discussion of tort as a deterrent
to a footnote, claiming "a lack of evidence" exists to support the
argument that tort plays a role in promoting safe conduct.25 A 1987
study released by the corporate-funded Conference Board, however,
directly contradicts Professor Sugarman's presumption that tort does
not deter unsafe behavior.2" In fact, the researchers concluded:
the impact of the liability issue seems far more related to rhetoric than to
reality. Given all the media coverage and heated accusations, the so-called
twin crises in product liability and insurance availability have left a rela-
tively minor dent on the economics and organization of individual large
firms, or on big business as a whole.2 7
The Conference Board study, which polled the risk managers of
232 major U.S. corporations,2 a concluded that product liability has
had a notable impact on the quality of products although it has had
only a minor impact on the ability of the corporations to conduct
business.2 ' The study indicates that liability suits have "motivated
management to positive actions: for example, improving product
safety, product use and warning labels, and manufacturing qual-
ity."30 Rather than preventing companies from developing and intro-
ducing products as Professor Sugarman claims,31 tort ensures that
the manufacturers have an incentive to introduce safe products.
Facts and Studies Contradict Professor Sugarman's Claim that
His Proposal Will Compensate All Victims Sufficiently
Although the major goal of Professor Sugarman's proposal is to
provide all victims with full compensation, his reforms would prevent
many victims from receiving sufficient compensation, create more
25. Id. at 801 n.13.
26. See WEBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSE THE CONFER-
ENCE BOARD REPORT No. 893 (1987).
27. Id. at 2.
28. The corporations involved in the study each have an annual minimum sales
revenue of 100 million dollars and represent a range of U.S. manufacturing and nonfi-
nancial service firms. Id. at 2.
29. The study indicates that product liability has had minimal impact on revenues,
market share, and employee retention. Id. at 2.
30. Id. at 21.
31. See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 795.
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victims by removing provisions in the law that punish wrongdoers,
and remove incentives for safe behavior.
By falling short of a national health plan that would cover the
medical needs of all victims, Professor Sugarman's proposal foregoes
many of the advantages it aims to achieve. The proposal discrimi-
nates against those who are not wage-earners and, therefore, fails to
compensate a large segment of the population. Professor Sugarman's
proposal not only fails to address the needs of the unemployed for
coverage of accident-related medical costs and loss of potential earn-
ing power - needs which are inadequately met by our current un-
employment insurance system - but also it fails to cover non-mar-
ketplace workers for loss of imputed income. For example, under
Professor Sugarman's system an injured housewife would not receive
the compensation she could receive under the current tort system for
the cost of hiring replacement housecleaning, childcare, and other
services.
Even many wage-earners who are covered by Professor
Sugarman's proposal would not receive sufficient compensation be-
cause of the arbitrary ceiling he places on pain and suffering awards.
Professor Sugarman recognizes that "dollars have symbolic value in
individualistic, capitalistic America, 3 2 but he fails to recognize that
in addition to symbolically soothing the victim's feelings of loss and
outrage, general damages also provide funds for whatever physical
comforts and accommodations can be arranged to improve the vic-
tim's quality of life. The traumas for which pain and suffering dam-
ages are awarded are substantial, often tragic, and still deserve the
full compensation they have received since the common law first ac-
knowledged claims of pain and suffering over 100 years ago.
Moreover, placing a cap on pain and suffering damages discrimi-
nates against those who are most seriously injured. The most seri-
ously injured individuals will be the least compensated under this
proposal since victims with damages lower than the $150,000 cap
may be fully compensated, while victims with more extensive injuries
will be denied full compensation.
A limit on pain and suffering damages will result in incomplete
compensation to some victims, and seriously reduce the potential lia-
bility and punishment would-be wrongdoers will face. When the
amount of money that an unsafe actor must pay is reduced, and
fewer injured victims bring suit, there will be a corresponding de-
32. Id. at 826.
crease both in the incentives businesses face to manufacture safer,
improved products and in the incentives for individuals and institu-
tions to behave safely. The presence of a damage award cap changes
a company's cost/benefit analysis concerning whether to market a
product with a known defect or to improve the product.33 To these
companies, limiting damage awards to $150,000 and removing any
possible liability for injuries that disable a victim for less than six
months significantly lessen the risk of marketing a potentially defec-
tive product.3 4
Studies Contradict Professor Sugarman's Assumption that
Limiting Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Contingency Fees Will Help
Plaintiffs
The deterrent effect of the tort system will be further reduced by
Professor Sugarman's proposal to limit attorneys' contingency fees.
These limits will reduce both the number of plaintiff lawyers willing
to represent victims and the suits victims will be able to bring. A
Rand analysis discovered that restrictions on a contingency fee
would "produce a suboptimal investment in litigation and hence
suboptimal deterrence and compensation." 35 Professor Sugarman
himself recognizes that a reduced fee percentage for the plaintiffs'
lawyer may have some effect on the lawyer's zealousness; 36 however,
he does not acknowledge that many plaintiffs' lawyers, presumably
the more able, may abandon this line of work and turn to other areas
of practice in which fees are not limited. As Professor Sugarman
stresses in his article, the quality of the lawyer representing a victim
has a significant @ffect on the outcome of a case. Therefore, a fee
limitation would reduce not only the quantity and quality of lawyers
representing victims, but also the victim's chances for full recovery.
Fewer successful suits would reduce the incentive to produce safe
products, to engage in safety practices, and to behave responsibly.
Professor Sugarman's goal of speeding up the litigation process
and reducing its overall cost would be better served by imposing lim-
itations on defense attorneys' fees - they are paid on an hourly ba-
sis and, therefore, have incentive to engage in frivolous or delaying
33. Ford's decision to manufacture the Pinto is an example of corporate decision-
making that weighed profit against safety and chose cost-effectiveness over saving lives.
34. We should not overlook the reality of the use and need for general damage
awards. Although not usually discussed, general damages often provide the source of
plaintiff attorneys' fees. This allows special damages to be saved for their intended use -
compensation. Without pain and" suffering awards, many plaintiffs will not be made
whole for their out of pocket economic loss.
35. P. DANZON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION vii (Rand
Corp. Inst. for Civ. Just. 1980).
36. Sugarman, supra note 1, at 836.
37. Id. at 796, 826.
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tactics. A policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation, writing in the
Wall Street Journal, noted: "[P]aying lawyers by the hour creates
an enormous conflict of interest between lawyers and their clients.
For the hourly fee lawyer, the longer the case goes on, the more
money he will get. Every pleading, motion, deposition and delay will
mean more money for him; regardless of whether it leads to a better
result for the client. Thus, from the standpoint of the client, as well
as general court efficiency, reformers should actually be trying to
encourage the contingent fee, not limit it."38
CONCLUSION
Whatever your analysis of the effectiveness of today's tort system
happens to be, a good tort system - and therefore any serious tort
reform proposal - must provide for the following: (1) punishment of
wrongdoers; (2) incentives for safety; and (3) sufficient and efficient
compensation of victims. Professor Sugarman's proposal does not of-
fer a practical solution for tort reform because, although it may
compensate some victims more efficiently than the present system, it
leaves many victims uncompensated, fails to punish wrongdoers, and
fails to provide incentives for safe behavior.
Professor Sugarman has missed an opportunity to address a com-
plicated problem in an objective manner. His unexamined biases
favor judges over juries, innocent shareholders over the innocently
injured, insurance company attorneys over plaintiff attorneys, and
the employed over the unemployed and non-wage earners. He has
ignored current data which show that tort law promotes safe con-
duct, that juries and judges work together to obtain equitable results,
and that his proposed reforms will not result in any cost savings. One
cannot make a proposal serious by calling it serious.
Our tort system needs to be objectively reviewed to determine
where its problems lie. Only then can we craft solutions which im-
prove rather than weaken our system. For those interested in serious
tort reform, a vacuum remains to be filled.
38. Gattuso, Don't Rush to Condemn Contingency Fees, Wall St. J., May 15,
1986, at 28, col. 3.

